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Title: Critical autism studies: exploring epistemic dialogues and intersections, challenging 
dominant understandings of autism 
In this paper we explore how our cultural contexts give rise to different kinds of knowledges of autism and 
examine how they are articulated, gain currency, and form the basis for policy, practice and political 
movements. We outline key tensions for the development of critical autism studies as an international, 
critical abilities approach. Our aim is not to offer a cross-cultural account of autism or to assume a 
coherence or universality of ‘autism’ as a singular diagnostic category/reality. Rather, we map the ways in 
which what is experienced and understood as autism, plays out in different cultural contexts, drawing on 
the notion of ‘epistemic communities’ to explore shifts in knowledge about autism, including concepts 
such as ‘neurodiversity’, and how these travel through cultural spaces. The paper explores two key 
epistemic tensions; the dominance of ‘neuro culture’ and dominant constructions of personhood and what 
it means to be human. 
Points of interest 
 Autism is often seen as a medical problem, which means that scientists try to understand 
it mainly in terms of how people’s brains work 
 This paper argues that this way of understanding autism can be a difficult prove and is 
not the only way of thinking and researching autism  
 A different way of understanding autism that values the abilities of people with autism is 
discussed in the paper.  
 We show how autism is understood differently in different parts of the world 
 We argue that ways of supporting people with autism vary across the world 
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Introduction:	placing	critical	autism	studies	
In this paper we outline the developing field of critical autism studies. We do so by 
drawing on our five different national contexts to offer points of similarity and difference in 
ways in which autism is understood, acted upon and experienced. The paper has emerged from 
discussions we have had about how the various locations in which we live and work (Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Sweden and the UK) understand and conceptualise autism. It is clear from our 
various positions that public discourse surrounding autism has had increased visibility over the 
past decade. However, this has been articulated differently across the contexts in which we work; 
for example in Brazil there has been a focus on psychoanalysis and psychiatry, whereas in 
Sweden the focus has been on autism as part of a broader group of “neuropsychiatric disabilities” 
(foremost including ADHD, ADD, autism and Tourette syndrome), independent living and 
employability of people with autism.  
We share a concern with dominant constructions of autism as they are  largely (but not 
exclusively) located within a neurobiological frame, and seek to challenge dominant 
understandings of autism as a neurological deficit, instead focusing on autism as an identity that 
is materially and discursively produced within specific sociocultural contexts. We explore 
different kinds of knowledges of autism as they are articulated, gain currency, and form the basis 
for policy, practice and political movements.  
The paper begins with an introduction to critical autism studies and the core theoretical 
elements formulating this position. The concepts of intercontextual knowledge and epistemic 
communities, both central to our theorising of autism through different cultural locations, are 
introduced. Rather than assume a cross-cultural analysis of autism we draw on an analytic frame 
of epistemic communities through which to articulate and develop the field. Epistemic 
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communities allow us to theorise the production of autism within particular cultural contexts. 
The concept of ‘intercontextual’ enables us to consider how ideas about autism travel between 
contexts and between groups with different agendas and engagements with the production of 
knowledge about autism. We examine two key epistemic tensions in developing a critical autism 
studies agenda: neuro culture and being human. The paper ends with our thoughts on a future 
research agenda for critical autism studies.  
Critical	autism	studies	
The term “critical autism studies” was coined in 2010 by Davidson and Orsini following 
a workshop in Canada that culminated in their co-edited collection, Worlds of Autism: Across the 
spectrum of neurological difference (2013). At the time, the exact contours of this emerging field 
were far from established, but they did identify at least three elements of an approach, on which 
we seek to build here.  
1. Careful attention to how power relations shape the field of autism  
2. Concern to advance new, enabling narratives of autism that challenge the predominant 
(deficit-focused and degrading) constructions that influence public opinion, policy and 
popular culture; and 
3. Commitment to develop new analytical frameworks using inclusive and non-reductive 
methodological and theoretical approaches to study the nature and culture of autism. The 
interdisciplinary (particularly social sciences and humanities) research required demands 
sensitivity to the kaleidoscopic complexity of this highly individualised, relational (dis)order. 
(Davidson and Orsini, 2013, p 12) 
Critical autism studies are therefore informed by and remain complementary to critical 
disability studies in the core elements of research focus, theoretical frame and politics (see for 
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example, Goodley, 2013; Pothier & Devlin, 2006; Meekosha & Shuttlework, 2009). However, 
the focus of research is placed on issues specific to autism rather than on the broader construct of 
disability. While complementary to critical disability studies, critical autism studies also troubles 
the common sense understanding of (dis)ability through interrogation of the construction of 
autism as a spectrum of difference configured as social and cognitive impairments, which may 
sit uneasily within a (dis)ability framework. Critical autism studies is interested in the 
neurologisation of autism in academic, professional and lay discourse, which positions both 
individuals with autism and, depending on context, non-autistic others (referred to as either 
‘neurotypicals’ (NTs) or non-autistics). The assumption of a non-autistic ‘norm’ is, in 
conventional understandings, unquestioned and naturalised. Hence the terminology used within 
our work is purposefully to signal a rejection of the more pathologising reference to ‘normal’ or 
‘typical’ (Davis, 1995) and questions the assumption of a non-autistic world view as our main 
point of reference.  
 Critical autism scholars are not, however, required to adhere to a firm, unmoveable set of 
criteria in delineating whether they are authentically critical, of course. The elements identified 
by Davidson and Orsini are intended to open new lines of inquiry, not foreclose the potential for 
critical scholarship in the autism field, especially research that bring advocates and academics 
from social sciences and humanities into productive tension and dialogue with dominant neuro-
biological approaches to understanding autism. One obvious challenge for critical autism 
researchers is to take seriously commitments to scholarly inquiry that avoids reproducing the 
hierarchical relations that govern research with so-called “vulnerable” populations. This means 
making a commitment to the meaningful involvement in research of people with autism 
themselves, in much the same way that research in many areas of identity politics and health 
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issues (such as feminist, LGBTQ and HIV/AIDS) is guided by principles of meaningful 
involvement. It is clear that within critical approaches to autism there is no sustainable 
dichotomy between non-autistic academics who study autism and autistic scholars/academics. At 
the same time, if we are to take seriously the call to critical inquiry, we need to ask the difficult 
questions of knowledge produced by and for people with autism. It is clear that people with 
autism do not speak with one voice. Anything less would be fundamentally insulting and harmful 
to people with autism themselves, and the myriad knowledge and experience they mobilise in the 
field of autism. 
Outside of the academy, autistic self-advocacy movements in many countries have 
developed to challenge autism advocacy that is often led by individuals who are not on the 
autism spectrum, or who are more interested in curing autism rather than assisting individuals 
who need social services or welfare supports. The role and purpose of these self-advocacy 
organisations varies across cultural contexts, and we should be clear that the continuum of 
advocacy varies from loosely organised self-advocates operating almost as individual actors to 
more formalised organisations such as the Autistic Self Advocacy Network in the US led by Ari 
Ne’eman and the National Autistic Society in the UK. In comparison to self-advocacy 
organisations in the US, Canada and the UK, Satedi, the French autistic persons’ organisation 
has eschewed radical disability organising, stressing the role of education and information 
activities for people with autism and remaining under the influence of parent associations, as 
opposed to people with autism themselves (Chamak, 2008; see also Chamak, 2014; and Chamak 
& Bonniau, 2013). Similar to the French contexts, in Brazil, organisations formed by civil 
society provide services and information to parents about autism and intellectual disabilities in 
general. These organisations range from philanthropic institutions to parent advocacy and 
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support groups, they offer a range of services, from information and support for parents to 
medical and educational services (Rios and Costa 2015). In Sweden there is an established self-
advocacy movement that has worked both separately from and in close cooperation with parent 
dominated associations as well as with allies among health professionals (Bertilsdotter Rosqvist 
et al, 2015). In Canada, there is a mix of organisational types, as well, with organisations that are 
off-shoots of U.S.-based groups such as mainstream organisation Autism Speaks, as well as other 
smaller organisations focused on framing autism care as a universal right under Canada’s system 
of health insurance (Orsini & Smith, 2010). 
Intercontextual knowledges of autism, cognitive normality and a critical abilities perspective 
 
We take as a starting point valuing the skills and agency of people with autism and work to 
demonstrate the ways in which dominant assumptions do not fully account for the skills, abilities 
and identities of people with autism. The implications of moving away from a deficit-focused 
understanding of autism to a critical abilities framework is twofold. Firstly, it helps to reframe 
the autistic subject in ways that appreciate the complex personhood of individuals on the 
spectrum. Secondly, it invites critical re-formulations of normative assumptions of ‘ability’, such 
as taken-for-granted assumptions of formal and informal/social competencies required for 
employability and the world of work. As critical autism researchers we question the received 
wisdom about what constitutes knowledge, as well as simplistic and harmful dichotomies, 
including that between fact and value. Drawing on Goodley (2014) we are considering autism 
through the split term dis/ability. He stresses that disablism and ableism and disability and ability 
must be understood simultaneously in relation to each other. Goodley writes “The slashed and 
split term denotes the complex ways in which opposites bleed into one another. (…) Dis/ability 
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studies keep disableism and ableism, disability and ability in play with one another, to explore 
their co-construction and reliance upon one another.” (Goodley, 2014, xiii) 
In contrast to the prevailing deficit construction of autism, which is individualising and 
pathologising, a critical abilities framework not only respects the complex personhood of autistic 
individuals but also reveals how the construction of autistic identities holds important insights 
for how to rethink, and extend, ideas associated with cognitive ‘normalcy’ (or ‘ability’) and 
difference.  
Occupying a variety of different theoretical, conceptual and political positions as a group, 
we are interested in creations of ‘autism’ as something happening somewhere: in the individual’s 
narratives/stories of themselves, cultural expressions such as art and literature, legal texts, 
scientific texts, health manuals, autobiographies, newspapers, magazines, political activism and 
interviews, etc. All of these situate autism in particular ways in different cultural contexts, but 
which sometimes pan and move between them. Hence in this paper we use an intercontextual 
approach to examine how the concept of ‘autism’ is articulated in different contexts and how 
particular discourses move across contexts and gain power and legitimacy. By intercontextual, 
we do not seek to offer, or assume, a ‘cross cultural’ perspective on autism; neither do we offer, 
or suggest that autism is a universal diagnostic/experiential truth understood similarly across 
cultural contexts. Rather, our various vantage points provide different cultural contexts within 
which to examine the construction of ‘autism’ as something that is discursively produced with 
material consequences (Hacking, 2002).  
Exploring	epistemic	communities	of	knowledge	about	autism	
Our various vantage points offer points of similarity and contrast between different 
approaches to issues such as understanding autism in relation to dis/ability (Deshong, 2012; 
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Goodley, 2014; Goodley et al, 2014) (and the inclusion, or not, of autism within this complex), 
differences in support for citizens (i.e. within a welfare state or other forms of provision), as well 
as including perspectives from both the Southern and Northern hemispheres. It is clear that the 
academic/scientific production of knowledge about autism is firmly located within particular 
geographical contexts, which give rise to particular understandings of autism that have become 
treated as universal ‘facts’. In a recent review of the production of knowledge about autism 
(Curran, 2014) it was found that the majority of research has been published by academics in the 
USA; however the UK, Canada and Sweden are also significant producers of knowledge. It was 
evident in the review that the UK is increasingly producing research about autism, whereas 
production of published research from the global South was found to be largely absent. 
We draw on the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ to argue that discourses about autism 
in media, policy, advocate and research communities are produced, drawn on and travel between 
different sociocultural spaces. The concept is developed from Whelan’s work (2007) which 
examined the ways in which women with endometriosis form collective identities through shared 
experiences of their health condition. She adapted Nelson’s (1993, cited in Whelan, 2007 p 958) 
conceptualisation of epistemological communities as, “a group which shares a body of 
knowledge and a set of standards and practices for developing and evaluating knowledge”. 
Epistemic communities articulate what is seen to be valid knowledge, legitimate experiences and 
claims to know. Nelson (1993, in Whelan, 2007) suggests that epistemological communities 
structure knowledge through: shared language and concepts; collective ‘public conceptual 
schemes’ which structure and make intelligible narratives of experience; and legitimate 
particular sets of theories, concepts and standards. It is evident that different perspectives on 
autism and cognitive normalcy arise within different cultural contexts and lead to the production 
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and legitimation of different knowledges. However it is also clear that particular kinds of 
knowledge, particularly ‘brain based’ and psychiatric explanations, have been prioritised and 
accorded legitimacy.  
We follow the work of philosopher Ian Hacking, whose idea of ‘looping’ suggests 
that the classifications and categories we use to define populations transform not only the 
categories but also the populations so defined (Hacking, 1995, 2002). The looping effect 
encompasses not only scientific and diagnostic developments, but also parent and self-
advocacy groups as well as general images of autism in popular movies, TV programs, 
personal testimonies, novels, blogs and other Internet resources. The label has undergone 
transformations because of changes in social contexts, developments in neuro-biological 
and genetic theories, as well as a constant flux of remaking through negotiations of the 
meaning of the label among professionals, parents and among people with autism 
themselves. As such the label is picked up and gains currency differently in different 
epistemic communities. 
This is evident in the shifting diagnoses of ‘autism spectrum disorders’ through 
different iterations of the DSM, particularly DSM-5, which has significantly altered the 
diagnostic ‘reality’ of autism. The psychiatric label of autism affects the persons so 
labelled and/or their families, and potentially changes interpretations of their behaviour, 
their identities and hence the meaning of the label itself. It is evident that the removal of 
Asperger Syndrome from the DSM-5 and its incorporation into the single diagnosis of 
autism spectrum disorder, has had profound implications for many people in cultural 
contexts such as the UK and Sweden where the DSM exerts significant disciplinary 
power. This shift corresponds to the aspiration of many autistic self-advocates, such as 
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Jane Meyerding, who thinks that classifying people under different categories within the 
autism spectrum was ‘seriously misleading,’ and declared her preference for seeing 
herself ‘as autistic, period.’1 Others regard it as a historic backlash, ‘when so many of us 
grew up thinking of ourselves as bad, broken and damaged, not unique and differently-
wired.’ In addition, as highlighted in the online petition by the Global and Regional 
Asperger’s Syndrome Partnership, signed by more than 8000 individuals, many children 
and adults, particularly those with Asperger, will lose the diagnosis and, with it, ‘crucial 
supports, services and legal protections’ (www.causes.com/actions/1593909-dsm-5-
committee-dont-reduce-the-criteria-for-an-autism-spectrum-disorder-in-the-dsm-5; see 
also Lutz, 2013). 
In the following section of the paper we explore contrasting/contraposing and intersecting 
notions of autism, from intercontextual and interdisciplinary perspectives in order to examine the 
epistemic communities of knowledge about the ‘disorder’ through two epistemic tensions: neuro 
culture and personhood and what it means to be human.  
	‘Neuro	culture’	and	autism	
Research on autism produced within the Anglo-American tradition (including Australia, as 
well as Sweden and other Western European countries) is dominated by neuro-biological 
perspectives. Within neuro-biological discourse autism is primarily described by psychiatrists, 
psychologists and neuroscientists as a neuro-biological disorder, as abnormalities in social 
interaction, emotional expression and recognition, and communication (see for example 
Noterdaeme & Hutzelmeyer-Nickels, 2010). Within this tradition there have been a number of 
cognitive theories proposed since the late 1980s, such as weak central coherence (Frith & Happe, 
                                                            
1‘Snippet’ from Jane Meyerding’s website, http://mjane.zolaweb.com/snipframe.html 
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1994), executive dysfunction (Ozonoff et al., 1991), theory of “mindblindness” (Baron-Cohen, 
1995), and a neurophysiological theory of mirror neuron dysfunction (Williams et al. 2001). 
Such findings have been the basis of a wave of interpretations about the centrality of the fully 
functioning “social brain”. Social neuroscience typically uses functional neuroimaging (fMRI) to 
demonstrate areas of the brain that function together to enable humans to predict other people’s 
actions on the basis of their beliefs and desires (“theory of mind”), and understand other people’s 
goals, intentions and emotions (Frith & Frith, 2010). In view of this heterogeneous field of 
research, it has been proposed that autism is best understood as a “multi-system disorder” 
(Charman, 2006), with genetic aetiology and brain based abnormalities, especially in the 
connectivity of prefrontal cortex and amygdala (Loveland et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2009).  
Despite this lack of coherence with respect to aetiology, contemporary research draws on 
several approaches to define biological markers, reflective of the dominant neurobiological focus 
of current research. There are three main trends: the search for the characteristics of the “autistic 
brain”, the quest for an autism genotype(s), and research on co-morbidity and environmental 
influences (Nadesan 2005). Lord et al. note that while there has been great hope for both 
structural and functional neuroimaging findings, “these approaches seldom provide data on an 
individual level, do not yet have well-accepted standards or replicability across time or site…and 
have rarely addressed questions of specificity of findings to ASD” (2012, p 491). As Nadesan 
(2005, p 172) points out, “the contemporary state of the research cannot provide any definitive, 
conclusive, and generalizable answer to the question of how autism emerges”. Neither is there 
consensus about the methodology to be used in clinical interventions (Feinberg & Vacca, 2000; 
Newschaffer & Curran, 2003). However, as Chloe Silverman notes, “although researchers have 
had trouble finding localized structural changes, autism has retained its identity as a genetic 
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disorder of the brain” (2012: 155).   
Furthermore, despite the lack of consensus and difficulty in finding brain-based 
explanations that fully account for autism, the research continues to look for them. Central to this 
conceptualisation of autism as a neurobiological disorder is the shared understanding of the 
‘deficient’ and ‘lacking’ nature of autism. In recent years neurobiology has become a hugely 
powerful way of understanding identity and citizenship (Rose & Novas, 2005), and has become 
powerful to the extent that it could be argued that we are living in a ‘neuro culture’ (Ortega & 
Vidal, 2011). Autism, commonly defined as a neuro-biological disorder and given a psychiatric 
diagnosis, illustrates this ‘neurobiologization’ of culture.  
The ‘neurologization’ of autism produced through conventional scientific research 
practices, as outlined above, has been challenged in some cultural contexts. For example, a 
competing discourse of neurodiversity has emerged as reaction to a medicalised neurological 
discourse. The neurodiversity perspective also draws on neuroscience or brain based vocabulary 
to describe autism although with depathologising aims. Within this perspective, autism is 
described within a framework of neurological diversity, as one of many variations in the 
functionality of the human brain (Broderick & Ne’eman, 2008), including alternative social 
functionalities (Brownlow et al, 2015. In line with this, Doan and Fenton (2013) argue that 
behaviours that are constructed as ‘atypical’ and undesirable within an ‘neurotypical’ (NT), or 
non-autistic (Attwood, 1998), understanding of the world, including hand-flapping, repeatedly 
ordering objects (e.g., toys) in rows, and profoundly restricted routines, have a function or 
purpose for the person with autism and hence are a valuable activity.  
The concept of neurodiversity can serve to challenge cognitive normalcy and to offer 
alternative, positive, interpretations of autism and autistic identity. Neurodiversity discourse 
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enables a challenge to dominant understandings of autism as a neurological deficit, instead 
focusing on autism as neurological difference.  It also offers a way of naming non-autism and 
rendering visible power structures that naturalise an NT world. The discourse has been widely 
drawn on, in some cultural spaces, by social movements dominated by adults with autism 
(Broderick & Ne’eman, 2008). For neurodiversity activists, the power of neuroscience serves to 
legitimise autism as a positive state rather than a deficit and provides a powerful mechanism for 
securing social rights and gaining political recognition (Ortega, 2013). Hence, the appeal to 
neurological bases of autism potentially allows critical autism studies to engage with the 
biological register in a non-reductionist or medicalised way, which fosters deficit-focused 
narratives of autism. Engaging with biology here means opposing the medical model of disability 
and to bolster one’s sense of identity that may help to erase the social stigma often associated 
with mental pathology and open up to non-pathologising ways of being.  
In the UK, discourses of neurodiversity are embedded in everyday understandings of 
autism and in professional practices (Runswick-Cole, 2014). Similarly, in Sweden the autistic 
self-advocacy movement has particularly drawn on neurodiversity discourse, where notions of 
neurodiversity are mobilised to argue for more autism-friendly and adapted work places 
(Bertilsdotter Rosqvist, manus). It has travelled less through other cultural contexts, such as 
Brazil, Australia and Canada. Thus we are interested in how it has moved and gained currency in 
some contexts but not others. Further we are interested in its potential and limitations both as a 
theoretical concept and as an ‘object’ already ‘out there’ to be explored. As a theoretical concept 
it can be used to explore alternative, more ability-informed understandings of autism, offering a 
critique of dominant discourse and a way of naming and scrutinising cognitive normality and 
NT-dominated perspectives.  
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The recourse to a ‘brain based’ discourse in which to locate an explanation of diversity 
rather than a deficit view of autism, is however not without its difficulties. The cerebralisation of 
autism, as invoked in the neurodiversity discourse, can be used to produce non-pathologised 
forms of identity and community, however it may also lead to a reductionist identity politics, 
which can narrow important aspects of personhood and reify identity (Ortega, 2013).  
Furthermore, the discourse may produce essentialised entities; an ‘us and them’, which creates 
unfruitful barriers between different kinds of advocates (Runswick-Cole, 2014).  Our interest, 
however, is in how neurodiversity has been adopted in - and adapted to - some contexts as a way 
to reframe debates about autism (as in the UK) and for political change (as in Sweden).  
 
Cognitive	normalcy	and	being	human	
On December 3rd, 2013, Swedish national radio broadcast a report about a man diagnosed 
with autism, who for more than one year had been isolated in a room at the forensic psychiatric 
regional clinic in the small Swedish town of Växjö. During this entire period, the staff had 
communicated with the man only through a small hatch in the door, and when he was 
occasionally allowed to come out into the exercise yard, none of the members of the staff were 
present. To federal counsel Hanna Jarvad at the Swedish National Society of Autism [Autism 
och Asperger-förbundet] it was obvious that the man was being mistreated, that the so-called 
care he received was based on ignorance and could in fact only be expected to worsen the 
symptoms of his autism. (Sveriges Radio) Surprisingly, this report did not induce any reaction 
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from the public or the medical experts, even though the man’s treatment contravenes not only 
Swedish legislation, but also the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UN). 2  
In Brazil, the newspaper O Globo published an article in July 2006, denouncing the 
existence of many autistic individuals in Brazil who spent their lives confined in empty rooms, 
locked in basements, frequently tied up.  As child neuropsychiatrist Raymond Rosenberg states, 
‘Unfortunately, they are “the children of the basement”. They spend their lives hidden, locked. It 
used to be like that and is today as well. We have even seen cases of chained boys’ (cited in 
Aggege, 2006, p 18).  
These stories demonstrate the fragility of citizenship rights for people with autism (c.f. 
Bertilsdotter Rosqvist et al, 2014) and the possibility of failing to qualify as ‘human’ (Bergenmar 
et al, 2015; Goodley et al, 2014). Following  Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston (1995), it can 
be argued that becoming human, or being recognised as human, can be seen as a process of 
qualification, including a struggle, for groups in the borderland of cognitive normality and 
cognitive normates (ie non-autistic people) (Garland Thomson, 1997). The Swedish and 
Brazilian examples above remind us that people with autism are still, in many cultural contexts, 
treated as not just deficient in skills and abilities but as less than human and subject to ‘inhuman’ 
treatment. We are interested in how humanizing and dehumanizing practices present in different 
contexts, particularly in how neurotypicality is produced as ‘ability’ in contrast to autism, and 
autistic traits produced as ‘disability’ whilst neurotypical traits are made intelligible, natural and 
human. The cultural production of childhood and ‘development’ demonstrates how culturally 
                                                            
2 The narrative was initially written and developed by Ann-Sofie Lönngren (Ph.d. and Associate Professor (Docent) 
in Literature, Center for Gender Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden) as part of a joint research application between 
Lönngren, Jenny Bergenmar and Hanna Bertilsdotter Rosqvist. Lönngren has kindly given her permission to draw 
on this narrative in this paper. 
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specific ideas about being human are translated into developmental science and the production of 
essentialised truths about ‘appropriate’ forms of development. Ideas about normative childhood 
and adulthood impact powerfully, and negatively, on children and adults with autism and their 
families (See for example Burman, 2008; O’Dell & Brownlow, 2015). 
A critical approach to understanding autism reveals how the construction of autistic and 
neurotypical traits and identities holds important insights for how to rethink ideas, for example of 
‘real’ humans and human citizenship, associated with and conditioned by cognitive normalcy. 
Nadesan (2005) proposed that ‘socially constructed standards of normalcy embedded in cultural 
values and practices not only shape our interpretations of autism, but also contribute to the 
production and transformation of people labelled with the disorder’ (Nadesan 2005, p 9). Within 
taken-for-granted assumptions about being human is the production of particular ways of ‘doing 
social’ (sociability or sociality) (c.f. Ochs & Solomon, 2010, Brownlow et al, 2015). Differences 
in sociability/sociality or social functionality have a dramatic impact on the social, cultural and 
legal position of the individual. Thus, ‘correct’ (i.e. non-autistic notions of) social functionality 
and emotionality appear to be central to Western definitions of humanity (see for example Smith, 
2007; Bourke, 2011).   
Conclusions: Intercontextual understandings and voices 
We conclude by reflecting on the agenda set by Davidson and Orsini (2013) to develop 
themes and analytics that can extend critical thinking around autism and the emerging field of 
critical autism studies. In thinking critically about autism we argue the following points need to 
shape the framework for a critical autism approach: 
 Recognize that ‘autism’ is both a diagnostic category and lived experience that 
shifts through different cultural contexts.  
17 
 
A challenge for critical autism studies is to take seriously how intercontextual 
understandings of autism shape the lived experience of autism, as well as the 
diagnosis category itself, and to do this without recourse to a traditional (positivist) 
cross-cultural perspective. We view intercontextual understandings and different 
epistemic communities of knowledge/experience of autism as key markers of the 
multiplicity of autism, and an opportunity to rethink our own theoretical 
assumptions about culture, knowledge, and identity.  Contrasting representations of 
autism worldwide could be used as a springboard to interrogate normative 
assumptions of humanness, ability, social and cognitive normalcy. Further, it 
enables us to explore different contexts and identify what is being included in 
understandings of autism and what is left out.  
 Rethink autistic identity production within sociocultural contexts.  
The analytic of epistemic communities can be useful to theorise and account for 
multiple perspectives and experiences rather than assuming that autism (or any 
other identity or experiential category) is a singular category or experience. Since 
our starting point is that identity is produced within specific sociocultural contexts, 
this is a key priority for us (see also, Davidson & Orsini, 2013). It is imperative 
that critical autism approaches account for the experience of people with autism 
who reject identity categories outright, or who think about their identities in fluid 
ways that defy way rigid constructions of identity that might be advanced by more 
conventional accounts in disability scholarship. If we fully appreciate the 
importance of intersectional analysis and multiple forms of oppressions, an autistic 
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identity might be one of a number of ways in which individuals understand their 
experience on the autism spectrum. 
 Examine the impacts of state provision and the economics of support/welfare.  
A comparative approach enables critical autism studies to examine the ways in 
which dominant neuro-biological constructions of autism (that span our cultural 
contexts and are evident in others internationally) take on different forms within 
different care systems and hence shape provision. Depending upon the definition 
and the pathology model in use, different treatments are provided (Block & 
Cavalcante, 2014, Cavalcante, 2003). For example, in Sweden the support offered 
is guided by the “normalization principle” in which it is stressed that “everyone is 
of equal value and has equal rights” (National Board of Health and Welfare 
[NBHW], 2009) at the same time as what is normal and what is included in a 
normal life is defined from a non-autistic perspective. These principles guide 
policies and programmes in the field of autism, such as support for finding 
employment in which being an adult citizen is intimately linked to engagement in 
work. This might be beneficial for some, but it narrowly constructs productivity 
and citizenship in neoliberal terms of one’s contribution to the work force. For 
example, the challenge in Sweden is how to reconcile an approach to welfare state 
support for people with autism that is guided by a care ethic stressing the rights of 
disabled people to meaningful employment and participation in society, with an 
increasingly neoliberal approach that measure one’s productivity in terms of labour 
force participation, stressing the obligation for all citizens to participate in society 
through work (Nouf et al, manus). It is clear that governments and financial 
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constraints are significantly affecting the level of support offered for those who 
need it. In Canada, for instance, where citizens enjoy universal health insurance, 
recent legal cases have tested the requirement to provide care for children on the 
autism spectrum (Orsini, 2009; Orsini and Smith, 2010).  In the UK changes to the 
‘welfare’ system has eroded significantly support and provision for disabled people 
including those with autism. 
 Explore the impacts of intervention approaches.  
The importance of the wider epistemological frameworks is evident in framing the 
intervention exchanges between people with autism and professionals. For 
example, in Brazil autism is viewed through both a psychoanalytic and psychiatric 
frame (Couto, 2012; Nunes, 2014; Pinto, 2005). Psychiatric services do not 
provide specialist services for autism, but autism is still seen as a psychiatric 
disorder, with the privileging of psychoanalytic approaches to autism. In Brazil, 
broader understandings of the categorisation of autism as either a psychosis or a 
disability, are also central, and have become a polarising issue, and different 
interventions tend to hinge on the  disease-based model in use  (Block and 
Cavalcante, 2014; Rios and Costa, 2015).  
 
Through this paper we have argued that an intercontextual approach places autism within 
particular cultural-institutional contexts whilst also examining the ways in which autism as a 
concept/discursive product moves through different cultural locations, instead of being reduced 
to a series of universal characteristics or truths. A transnational focus must also build on the 
increasing interest among disability studies scholars in knowledge in and perspectives from the 
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global south, especially approaches that account for the enduring role of colonialism and racism 
in producing disability (see discussion in Meekosha and Shuttleworth 2009). As they correctly 
point out, “Although living in a world where race, racism, nationalism and globalisation are 
dominant forces, disability studies largely avoids these issues” (Meekosha and Shuttleworth 
2009, 64)Foregrounding intersectional approaches to autism can help us to critically engage with 
notions of ability (and competence), and the normative production of ability through 
representations of a disabled ‘other’ (c.f. DeShong, 2012; Goodley, 2014), which exclude a more 
diverse way of defining ability. Critical autism studies requires both an abilities-perspectives 
(rather than a focus on deficits) to explore counter-hegemonic, alternative discourses of autism - 
and a critical perspective on the hegemonic discourses in which the normative productions of 
ability produce autism and autistic traits as deficits and lack. A critical perspective to autism 
should avoid reifying neurology or brain-based discourses of neurodiversity, but rather view 
these discourses as shaping and co-constituting autism (and neurotypicality). We need to theorise 
ability in its many forms, and advance approaches that enable people with autism with a range of 
abilities to co-produce knowledge about autism.  
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